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Porter’s (1998) claim that the macro-level context or the industry in which a firm operates influences competition and in turn
profitability.
A review of literature reveals that EO is often explored
in mature industries such as manufacturing, retail, and banking (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Lee, Lee, & Pennings,
2001; Richard, Wu, & Chadwick, 2009; Wiklund & Shepherd,
2005). As industries have evolved and new ones have emerged,
scholars have begun to assess EO in firms located in a
broad range of high-tech industries (Bierly, Damanpour, &
Santoro, 2009; Hung & Chiang, 2010; Stram & Elfring, 2008)
and small to medium-sized firms (Hughes & Morgan, 2007;
Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss, 2010; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg,
& Wiklund, 2007). Although EO has been used to assess
firms’ entrepreneurial disposition across industry contexts, few
empirical assessments of EO have been conducted in the
biotechnology industry (Renko, Carsrud, & Brännback, 2009).
We assert that the biotechnology context is different from the
settings found in other high-technology industries. For several reasons, the biotechnology industry provides a unique
opportunity to assess EO.
Developing a new human health drug might take a firm
10 years and cost $1.3 billion USD (Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America [PhRMA], 2013). Many dedicated biotechnology firms (hereafter DBFs) emerged from
academic settings to commercialize scientists’ research (Hsu,
Roberts, & Eesley, 2007; Zucker & Darby, 1997), and employ
business models that are ill equipped to meet the financial
demands of supporting long-term research and development
(R&D) product investments (Pisano, 2006). DBFs are those
biotechnology firms that operate on the cutting edge of research
by pushing scientific frontiers while exploring opportunities for
commercialization (Momma & Sharp, 1999) and also lack the
managerial, financial, and human resources to develop new therapies using their own resources (Madkadok & Osegowitsch,
2000). DBFs must collaborate in order to survive but have a high
failure rate even with such collaboration (Gassman, Reepmeyer,
& Zedwitz, 2004; Oliver, 2004). DBFs may benefit from developing an entrepreneurial disposition (Hughes & Morgan, 2007)
to enhance their sourcing strategies (Pérez-Luño, Wiklund, &

The goal of this article is to explore under what contexts
do biotechnology firms exhibit an entrepreneurial orientation?
To achieve this goal, we assess entrepreneurial orientation as
a configuration and individual dimension across three contexts:
organizational structure, location, and age. Analyses of survey data from U.S. biotechnology firms indicate that ownership
structure was the only contextual factor to yield differences in
biotechnology firms’ entrepreneurial orientation when assessed
as a configuration. However, the analysis identified differences
at the multidimensional level within all three contexts. Both
theoretical and practical implications of our findings are provided. Organization Management Journal, 11: 84–100, 2014. doi:
10.1080/15416518.2014.927322
Keywords biotechnology; entrepreneurial orientation; environment;
survey; t-tests

INTRODUCTION
The evolution and assessment of a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation (hereafter EO) has been inextricably linked to context.
EO is the end result of a firm’s strategy-making process that
encompasses the range of activities that executives engage in to
formulate and implement their firm’s strategic goals and objectives (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997). Context plays a critical
role in the entrepreneurial strategy-making process. Consider
that Miller’s (1983) development of a construct to measure firmlevel entrepreneurial behaviors coincided with the decline of the
manufacturing industry in the United States. During that period
in U.S. industrial history, “Japanese share of world exports in
a number of key industries continued to expand throughout
the 1980s, usually at the expense of Western manufacturers”
(Bettis, Bradley, & Hamel, 1992, p. 7). Supporting the criticality of context, an early study of EO by Covin and Slevin
(1989) explored whether small manufacturing firms would benefit from adopting an EO in hostile and benign environments.
In their research, Covin and Slevin (1989) attempt to explore
Address correspondence to Dorothy Mary Kirkman, University of
Houston–Clear Lake, 2700 Bay Area Blvd., Houston, TX 77058, USA.
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Cabrera, 2010), to foster a learning environment by maintaining
adaptability (Li, Liu, Yi, & Li, 2008), and to gain an advantage
by using knowledge resources (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).
The uniqueness and complexity of the biotechnology context
lead us to segment our research question into two parts. In the
first part, our intention is to examine: Under what circumstances
do DBFs exhibit EO? EO exists across a spectrum of behaviors,
from entrepreneurial on one end to conservative on the other
(Miller, 1983). The degree to which a firm is entrepreneurial
depends, in part, on the extent to which it innovates, acts proactively, and is willing to take risks (Wang, 2008). A conservative
orientation involves minimal technological and product innovation, a cautious posture, and top management’s propensity to
avoid risks (Covin & Slevin, 1989). As business environments
become more complex and dynamic, empirical studies reveal
that firms whose dispositions lie closer to the entrepreneurial
end of the spectrum will outperform those firms whose behaviors can be classified as conservative (Covin & Slevin, 1989;
Wiklund, 1999).
The dynamism of the business environment has led scholars
to use different conceptualizations of EO to assess firm-level
entrepreneurial behaviors. The most common and widely used
conceptualization of EO is as a configuration. In this manifestation, an EO reflects a pattern of decision making that emerges
over time as a firm solves problems related to survival and
those answers become encoded as routines that guide top managers when they are creating a firm’s strategy (Davis, Marino,
Aaron, & Tolbert, 2011; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Specifically,
the configuration perspective characterizes EO as a system of
interdependent entrepreneurial behaviors. Conversely, the multidimensional approach proposes that some dimensions may be
beneficial while others are not (Hughes & Morgan, 2007). The
degree to which firm-level entrepreneurial behaviors manifest
depends on a firm’s situation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).
The different EO perspectives led us to the second part
of our research question: In what contexts will the configurational or multidimensional form be more helpful to a DBF? We
develop hypotheses that explore how contextual factors such as
location, ownership structure, and age influence the manifestation of a firm’s EO. First, there are close linkages between
the entrepreneurial process and location (Malecki, 1997). Since
the origin of the U.S. biotechnology industry, firms have been
known to develop around centers of excellence (Chiesa &
Chiaroni, 2005). Second, structure has long been considered a
major contingency in organizational research (Burns & Stalker,
1961). Studies have found that ownership structure influences
the strategic choices a firm’s executives make regarding R&D
investments (Shefer & Frenkel, 2005). Third, age highlights
how young firms enter the market with new technology, business models, and processes that disrupt existing ways of doing
things and displace existing firms (Schumpeter, 1934; Tripsas,
1997).
The contribution that our study makes is twofold. First, there
has been a debate regarding whether EO was appropriately
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conceptualized as a multidimensional or gestalt construct
(Covin, Green, & Slevin, 2006). Although both conceptualizations are considered appropriate forms, few studies have
conducted a simultaneous comparison of the two conceptualizations. By utilizing both assessments of EO, this article provides
data that can be used to draw insight regarding the situation
under which one conceptualization may be more appropriate
than the other.
Second, this study contributes to investigating
entrepreneurial behavior in DBFs, which engage in long
periods of entrepreneurial activity when attempting to create
new therapies (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), but it is unclear
whether those behaviors emerge from a general pattern of
decision making or from individual entrepreneurial activities
within the firm. Other than the Renko and peers (2009)
exploratory assessment of EO in DBFs located in California
and Sweden, an assessment of EO solely in DBFs has been
limited. We believe our study provides a deeper examination
of firm-level entrepreneurship by assessing DBFs across the
United States, large and small, publicly traded and private,
which reflects the actual population. Since failure in the
biotechnology industry is commonplace, this study may deepen
our understanding of how DBFs attempt to compete in a
complex environment.
The structure of the article proceeds as follows. The next section provides a theoretical platform to develop the hypotheses
in the third section. The fourth section summarizes the research
methodology and presents the results. In the final section, we
discuss the relevance of the findings, offer ideas for future
research, and identify study limitations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Who Is the Entrepreneur?
For decades, the study of entrepreneurship has been plagued
by the following question: Who is the entrepreneur—the individual or the firm? The entrepreneur is the actor, who possesses
“the dream and the will to found a private kingdom . . . and the
joy of creating, of getting things done or simply of exercising
one’s energy and ingenuity” (Evans, 1949, p. 93). When assessing entrepreneurship, scholars used either the trait approach or
the cognitive perspective, both of which focused on the individual as the entrepreneur. The former put forth the notion that
some individuals are predisposed to becoming entrepreneurs
because they possess specific traits (McClelland, 1961), and the
latter suggested that some people are more sensitive to detecting
change, understanding its significance, and recognizing its commercial potential (Kirzner, 1979). The development of methods
to assess firm-level entrepreneurship stalled the debate.
As the business climate grew more competitive, typologies arose that described firm-level entrepreneurship.
Miles and Snow (1978) offered the “Prospector” as an
entrepreneurial-focused strategic type who searched for
opportunities to innovate. Mintzberg’s (1973) entrepreneurial
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mode of strategy-making also included some aspects of the
entrepreneurial process. Then Miller (1983) examined how
entrepreneurship occurred in different types of firms by
specifically examining firm-level behaviors. This exploration
represented a shift in entrepreneurial studies away from
individual characteristics to a more firm-centric approach.
Miller boldly helped shift the debate away from individual
to firm-level behaviors (Brown & Davidsson, 1998). However, a
deeper examination of the construct reveals the significant influence of individuals (i.e., managers). The assessment of EO is
not based on actual outcomes or activities, but rather involves
managers’ perceptions of the entrepreneurial process within
their firm. Focusing on managerial opinions and perceptions
draws attention to whether managers are assessing actual firmlevel behaviors or their opinion of them. Although the role of
managers in the assessment of EO may cause concern, studies
have found that top management teams’ perceptions and categorization play a critical role in the strategic issues that a firm
addresses (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). We do know that firmlevel entrepreneurship exists beyond top management teams’
perceptions and a chief executive officer’s (CEO) tenure.
For example, 3M, one of the world’s largest corporations, has a long history of entrepreneurial behavior, transcending the tenures of CEOs and top management teams
(cf. Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999, p. 422). The psychometric
qualities of the scales may draw into question the extent to
which managerial perceptions or firm-level behaviors are being
assessed. However, EO does provide scholars with the means
to assess firm-level entrepreneurial behaviors. The remainder of
the literature review offers a more detailed assessment of EO
and related research.
Entrepreneurial Orientation
EO emerged from a stream of literature that focused on
the entrepreneurial process or “the methods, practice, and
decision-making styles managers use to act entrepreneurially”
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 136). Miller (1983) examined how
entrepreneurship occurred in different types of firms by specifically examining firm-level behaviors. Covin and Slevin (1989)
refined Miller’s entrepreneurial research, writing,
The entrepreneurial choices made by the firm reflect its
entrepreneurial posture, which is demonstrated by the extent to
which top managers are inclined to take business-related risks,
to favor change and innovation in order to obtain a competitive
advantage for their firm. (p. 77)

Management literature contains many empirical studies
that examined the entrepreneurial choices that firms enact to
enhance their performance (Covin & Slevin, 1989; DeClercq,
Dimov, & Thongpapanl, 2010; Li, Huang, & Tsai, 2009;
Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Stram & Elfring, 2008; Wiklund
& Shepherd, 2003). However, EO does not always lead
to increased firm performance (Hughes & Morgan, 2007).
On the one hand, Miller (1983) originally conceptualized

EO as a configuration, where innovativeness, risk taking, and
proactiveness must positively covary in order for an EO to manifest (Covin & Wales, 2011). On the other hand, scholars have
argued that the reason for the mixed performance is that the
conceptualization of EO as a gestalt “neglects the individual
influence of each dimension and assumes a universal and uniform influence by each dimension” (Hughes & Morgan, 2007,
p. 652). Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) research on EO as a multidimensional construct drew attention to some concerns about
the configurational approach. The scholars put forth the notion
that depending on a firm’s context, it may not be necessary or
even efficient for it to possess all three dimensions and that each
dimension can vary independently and might not be beneficial
to a firm at different points in time.
The multidimensional approach is gaining traction
among EO scholars. Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, and Frese’s
(2009) meta-analysis of 51 EO studies revealed that 37 studies
viewed EO as a one-dimensional construct and 14 studies
viewed it as having three separate dimensions. The multidimensional conceptualization of EO is relatively new, but there is a
growing stream of studies that have adopted the new approach
to develop a detailed understanding of phenomena (Kollmann
& Stöckmann, 2012; Pérez-Luño et al., 2010; Ramachandran
& Ramnarayan, 1993).

EO Dimensions
There are three agreed-upon dimensions of EO:
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking. First,
innovativeness reflects a firm’s desire to support new ideas
and foster creativity when developing new products (Walter,
Auer, & Ritter, 2006). Research suggests that EO supports (a)
learning and innovation outcomes by triggering resource and
knowledge mobilization to generate an advantage (Li, Huang,
& Tsai, 2009), (b) the development of exploration and exploitation innovations (Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2012), and (c) the
sourcing of innovation (Pérez-Luño et al., 2010). Second, the
proactive dimension refers to a posture of anticipating and
acting on future wants and needs in the marketplace, thereby
creating a first-mover advantage (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).
Empirical research has documented that pioneering firms may
achieve first-mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery,
1988) in hostile industries (Covin, Slevin, & Heeley, 2000).
Clausen and Korneliussen’s (2012) examination of incubator
firms revealed that EO positively influenced a firm’s ability to
commercialize technology and bring it to market. Finally, risk
taking represents a willingness to commit resources to implement projects, activities, and solutions that inherently contain
a high level of uncertainty regarding the likely outcomes
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Prior research reveals mixed results
when assessing the relationship between risk and performance.
Hughes and Morgan (2007) investigated the relationships
between the EO dimensions and product and customer performance in young firms located in incubators. The analysis found
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that risk taking positively influenced product innovation but
negatively influenced customer retention. A study conducted
by Wiseman and Catanach (1997) suggested that innovative
performance is context specific—it was beneficial in certain
contexts and detrimental in others.
Contexts
Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) argument supporting the multidimensionality of EO draws attention to the situatedness of
firm operations. The authors proposed that the entrepreneurial
process manifests in firms based on their context. In some situations, a firm may need a general pattern of decision making
to be entrepreneurial, but in another context a firm may be
entrepreneurial with the existence of one dimension. Initially,
we argued that context determines the form and the situation in
which EO will manifest. These situational factors include factors that are internal or external to the firm, such as technology,
structure, size, age, environment, management practices, industry trends, or business cycles (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 2000).
In the next section, we put forth age, location, and ownership
as three contextual factors that influence how EO shows up in
firms.
HYPOTHESES
Does Age Matter Regarding EO?
Innovation is the heart of entrepreneurship (Drucker, 2002).
Theories of entrepreneurship often characterized firms as
entrepreneurial because they enter the market and innovate
by developing novel resource combinations, which instigates
the demise of the old way of doing things and brings forth
new methods, markets, and potential for profits (Schumpeter,
1934). Scholars have proposed that new firms tend to have a
higher EO than existing firms because the potential to attain
entrepreneurial profits leads new firms to be more innovative,
risk taking, and proactive than their mature counterparts (Zhao,
Li, Lee, & Chen, 2011). Although the premise that young firms
might be more entrepreneurial than existing firms might be relevant in most industries, the biotechnology industry is different.
Consider this fact: Transforming an invention into an innovation is a decade-long process that costs nearly US$1.3 billion
(Herper, 2012) and underlies a 90% new firm failure rate
(Scarmoutzos, 2006). Given the resource-intensiveness of innovation, we argue that existing firms will have the resources to
out-innovate, in terms of bringing a product to market, their
younger peers.
New DBFs—those firms less than 8 years old (Eisenhardt
& Schoonhoven, 1990)—may have weak EOs because they
lack critical resources and managerial experience. First, DBFs
emerged with the promise and potential to revolutionize drug
development (Kaplan, Murray, & Henderson, 2003; Zucker
& Darby, 1996) with commercial applications of recombinant DNA and molecular genetics technology (Audretsch &
Feldman, 2003). Unfortunately, the revolution was contained
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to the early stage of the drug-development value chain.
Downstream activities remained unchanged, to the benefit of
existing firms that possess expertise in clinical trials, marketing,
and production that are dedicated to marketing the new product
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Many young DBFs lack the multidisciplinary capabilities that are necessary to create new drugs
(Madhok& Osegowitch, 2000). New DBFs sparked the revolution, but existing firms with vast financial and human resources
and late-stage expertise will benefit from their inventions.
Second, many young DBFs are led by scientist-managers
(Holcomb, Holmes, & Connelly, 2009) who have academic
backgrounds and lack the capabilities required to effectively
develop and manage a commercial research enterprise (Niosi,
2003). Executives play a critical role in a firm’s ability to manifest an EO (Covin et al., 2006; Wales et al., 2011), which
reflects executives’ biases toward making firm-level decisions
regarding innovation, proactiveness, and risk taking. To make
optimal entrepreneurial decisions, “managers need to know the
context or framework that indicates the rules of the game, the
appropriate resources (means), and the index of value (ends)”
(Gaglio, 1997, p. 533). Scientist-executives may not understand
the business of commercializing basic science. Consequently,
with weak resource and knowledge endowments, new firms may
be unable to make full and effective use of an EO (Hughes &
Morgan, 2007).
Conceivably, existing DBFs have made the transition from
an owner-manager to professional managers (Cooke, 2001)
who have industry experience and understand all phases of the
drug-development value chain. Professional managers should
have knowledge of industry and the commercialization process
that will enable a DBF to develop its inventions, appropriate
returns from them, and identify and exploit other value-creating
opportunities. Given these insights:
• Hypothesis 1: Existing DBFs will possess a higher
level of EO than do new DBFs.
EO dimensions. Successful innovation involves invention
as well as commercialization (Lee et al., 2010). For several
reasons, new DBFs often focus solely on the research part of
R&D that involves creating new inventions because DBFs can
easily access or develop resources that support knowledge creation (early-stage development). For one reason, new DBFs
maintain strong ties to academia to gain access to scientific
and technological knowledge (George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002).
University discoveries are a critical source of new knowledge
for biotechnology firms (Prevezer, 1997). DBFs can use university knowledge, in the form of inventions and prototypes,
to expand their R&D portfolios (Stuart, Ozdemir, & Ding,
2007).The ability to leverage their resources in order to gain
legitimacy is another possible reason that DBFs focus on early
stage research. Since there is a high level of uncertainty associated with early-stage research, collaborating with a high status
partner such as a university can help new DBFs enhance their
attractiveness as potential alliance partners by signaling the
quality of their science and establishing their legitimacy (Stuart,
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Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Drug development is a resource- and
knowledge-intensive process that occurs within a network of
economic actors (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). To gain entrée
to those networks, new DBFs use their scientific expertise to
demonstrate the quality of their science, which enhances their
attractiveness as possible collaboration partners and provides
them with an opportunity to gain access to the knowledge and
resources they need to support further research efforts.
While new DBFs use their inventions to establish the legitimacy of their science, existing DBFs search for opportunities
to exploit their existing R&D assets through commercialization or licensing (Stuart, Ozdemir, & Ding, 2007). Existing
DBFs are focused on the commercialization process by gaining access to complementary downstream capabilities that are
needed to create new therapies (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).
In the biotechnology industry, commercialization requires the
skills and capabilities of for-profit, nonprofit, and government
entities (Chesbrough, 2006). It may be beneficial for existing
firms to develop a proactive disposition. Research has found
that proactive firms gain access to developing diverse alliance
portfolios (Marino et al., 2002) and internetwork ties (Stram &
Elfring, 2008) that allow them to secure partners with the complementary skills and resources required to commercialize the
DBF’s R&D projects.
Regardless of the stage of the R&D project—research or
development—drug development is a risky endeavor. On the
one hand, new firms focus on invention but only 1 out
of 10,000 compounds will become commercialized products
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). In addition, these firms encounter
risks when acquiring university inventions because these technologies are often licensed at an early stage of development
when it is difficult to assess the commercial potential of an
invention (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). On the other hand, existing firms often have low bargaining power when engaging in
development alliances with large pharmaceutical firms because
they lack the financial and other capabilities to manage the commercialization and are at risk of falling prey to opportunistic
behavior when all they bring to an alliance is the technology
(Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Lerner & Merges, 1998). The risk
may be greater for new DBFs because there is a possibility
they will acquire a university invention and spend resources to
develop it, only to find out that there are few commercial applications for it. In development alliances, existing DBFs have
assets they can sell or develop. Thus:
• Hypothesis 1a: Innovativeness scores of existing DBFs
will be higher than those of new DBFs.
• Hypothesis 1b: Proactiveness scores of existing DBFs
will be higher than those of new DBFs.
• Hypothesis 1c: Risk-taking scores of new DBFs will
be higher than those of existing DBFs.
EO as a Geographically Based Phenomenon
Agglomerations are spatially bounded concentrations of economic activities (Boshuizen, Geurts, & Van Der Veen, 2009,

p. 184). We put forth the notion that clusters are diverse ecosystems of complex combinations of specialized knowledge that
DBFs seek to simultaneously acquire the resources that are necessary to create new therapies and develop an EO. A review of
literature reveals two reasons that cluster DBFs are more likely
to develop an EO than are their remotely located peers. First,
these firms have access to knowledge. Marshall (1890) theorized that knowledge-based factors such as specialized labor,
knowledge spillovers, and suppliers make clusters attractive.
The concentration of knowledge provides firms with immediate
access to the financial, human, institutional, and technological
resources (Cooke, 2001). Since developing human health therapies is a multidisciplinary activity (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999),
the pooling of specialized knowledge in a cluster enables firms
to effectively and efficiently conduct R&D activity. Second,
clusters are hotbeds of entrepreneurial activities (Porter, 1998).
Resources such as human capital and knowledge spillovers play
a critical role in cluster-based entrepreneurship (Acs et al.,
2009; Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007). Given that clusters contain diverse resources to support the development of an EO, we
claim:
• Hypothesis 2: Cluster firms’ composite EO scores will
be higher than those of noncluster firms.
EO dimensions. Biotechnology firms located in clusters
can secure various resources that can be leveraged to build an
EO. From an innovative perspective, technically skilled employees flock to clusters to take advantage of career opportunities
(Kukalis, 2010). In a fluid labor market, a firm benefits from the
training and experience of another firm by hiring away some of
the latter firm’s workers (Chesbrough, 2006). These employees
open their new firm up to new ideas and creativity (Østergaard,
Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011). Learning through hiring is
an important source of spillovers and positively influences innovation (Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009). Noncluster
firms may not have access to superior technical labor in their
physical location or may have to pay higher wages to lure talent
to their location, both of which decrease their ability to innovate.
Several motives underlie cluster DBFs’ proactiveness. First,
the theory of knowledge spillover entrepreneurship suggests
that knowledge-rich environments such as clusters promote
entrepreneurial activity because of the abundance of exploitable
opportunities (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2007). Owen-Smith
and Powell (2004) contended that knowledge spills over via
channels—social connections between employees, scientists,
and faculty members. In these channels, “informal, spontaneous, and sometimes even accidental exchange of knowledge
takes place as a result of social relations in the local or regional
milieu” (Moodysson, 2008, p. 451).
In addition, face-to-face interaction promotes the efficient
transfer of tacit knowledge. For example, co-location provides
cluster DBFs with opportunities to gain access to novel technology and scientific breakthroughs by acquiring university
inventions directly from faculty, thereby circumventing the
university administrative processes (Markman, Phan, Balkin,
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& Gianiodis, 2005). Third, cluster firms often partner with
each other (Lechner & Dowling, 2003). These partnerships
enable a DBF to build their networks and gain entrée to global
pipelines—strategic partnerships with global reach (Bathelt,
Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004).
An advantage of being located in a cluster is the reduction
of the risks and uncertainties that emerge during the drugdevelopment process. There is a high level of uncertainty associated with drug development. Cluster DBFs can reduce their
uncertainties by observing actions of cluster firms (Bell, 2005).
While cluster firms are located in areas rich with knowledge
resources, noncluster firms have to develop unique strategies to
secure some of the knowledge that is available to cluster firms
(Fontes, 2005). Noncluster DBFs’ isolated location may prevent
them from securing the requisite resources required to build an
EO. Thus:
• Hypothesis 2a: Cluster DBFs’ innovativeness scores
will be higher than those of noncluster DBFs.
• Hypothesis 2b: Cluster DBFs’ proactiveness scores
will be higher than those of noncluster DBFs.
• Hypothesis 2c: Noncluster DBFs’ risk-taking scores
will be higher than those of cluster DBFs.
Is EO a Function of Ownership?
Organizational structure is sometimes defined as the arrangement of workflow, communication, and authority relationships
within an organization (Covin & Slevin, 1991, p. 17). It is
widely accepted among scholars that a firm’s ownership structure influences its R&D investment decisions. Ownership structure reflects a source of power that can be used to support or
oppose managemen,t depending on how it is concentrated and
used (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980, p. 655). In this study, a firm’s
ownership structure reflects whether the firm is private or has
publicly traded stock.
In the public arena, ownership structure is important because
the owners (shareholders) hire executives as agents to operate
the firm in their absence. As agents of the firm, managers may
be inclined to make R&D investment decisions that support
their personal well-being instead of maximizing shareholder
value (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993). Although R&D investments play a critical role in a DBF’s ability to develop new
therapies, an EO, in the form of a configuration, also involves
other entrepreneurial behaviors such as proactiveness that might
be conducive to public firms.
There are conditions under which public firms might benefit
by developing a consistent pattern of entrepreneurial behavior
to promote goal attainment and meeting investors’ expectations. First, managers of public DBFs have many voices they
should pay attention to when creating R&D investment strategies (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). A DBF’s
managers must make sufficient investments in R&D to provide
the firm with the flexibility to identify and exploit opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) as investors and the board
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of members change their preference for R&D investments.
Second, executives of public firms must possess superior
resource-picking skills (Barney, 1986) because they must convince a large number of investors that the firm is pursuing
quality projects (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999). Conversely,
private firms do not endure the rigors of financial reporting,
managing investors’ expectations, and meeting listing requirements. Therefore, we propose:
• Hypothesis 3: Public DBFs’ EO scores will be higher
than those of private firms.
EO dimensions. Although public firms may have available adequate funds that can be used to explore new scientific frontiers, private firms are more likely than public firms to participate in scientific discovery activities.
Shareholders of biotechnology firms seek significant returns for
their risky investments. Public biotechnology firms are under
immense pressure to generate profits; therefore, senior managers direct resources toward commercializing new products
(Khilji, Mroczkowski, & Bernstein, 2006). Entebang, Harrison,
and de Run’s (2010) study of EO in public firms in Malaysia
revealed that public firms do have a strong emphasis on R&D
but most of their activities focus on exploitation and commercialization activities.
Conversely, private DBFs direct their energies to innovative
activities in order to secure patents, which send signals to third
parties about the appropriability of their R&D portfolio (Baum
& Silverman, 2004). Since knowledge-based assets are more
difficult to assess than are tangible ones (Higgins & Rodriguez,
2006), innovation, as evidenced by a firm’s ability to create
patents, plays a critical role in assisting outside parties to evaluate a private DBF’s worth. We contend, creating new knowledge
is important to private firms while generating value from existing inventions plays a critical role in public firms’ innovation
strategies.
From a proactive perspective, publicly traded DBFs focus
their attentions on securing external investments and meeting shareholders’ expectations (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991).
Enacting a proactive strategy focuses publicly traded DBFs’
executives’ attention toward exploiting existing assets today to
generate profits in order to prevent the delisting of a DBF’s
stock due to insufficient capitalization (Golec & Vernon, 2007)
or to avoid liquidation when commercialization projects fail
(Pollack, 2009). Unlike their peers in public firms, executives
in private DBFs are isolated from competitive market pressures and have more direct control and power over their firms.
Executives in private DBFs can choose whether to explore new
or exploit existing science and/or technology.
Managers within the organization place their reputations and
financial futures at stake when investing in innovative activities that absorb significant resources and may not lead to any
identifiable benefits. The possibility of failure may induce risk
aversion because executives do not want to damage their reputation (Zahra, 1996) and they want to protect their job security by
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avoiding investment in risky projects (Hoskisson et al., 1993;
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994). Executives of private
firms do not encounter such pressures. These managers have
a wide range of authority and control and might not be replaced
even when their ventures fail (McEachern, 1975). Given this
insight, we propose:
• Hypothesis 3a: Private DBFs’ innovativeness scores
will be higher than those of public firms.
• Hypothesis 3b: Publicly owned DBFs’ proactiveness
scores will be higher than those of private firms.
• Hypothesis 3c: Private DBFs’ risk-taking scores will
be higher than those of public firms.
METHODOLOGY
Sample
Data for this study were collected from U.S. biotechnology
firms engaged in the development, production, and marketing
of new biotechnology drug therapies (Pisano, 1990). The selection process began with 1,000 DBFs collected from HOOVERS
and state biotechnology associations’ member lists. Each DBF’s
North American Industry Classification Scheme (NAICS) codes
were verified, using an A-to-Z database, to ensure that each
DBF creates human health therapies, because of the arduous
regulatory conditions monitoring the new-drug approval process, which can last nearly a decade (Rothaermel & Deeds,
2004). One hundred sixty-two DBFs were eliminated during
the process of verification, resulting in a list of 838 potential
respondents.
Survey Administration
A survey was used (Table 1) to collect the firm-level data for
all the variables assessed in this study (Lyon et al., 2000). Since
executives, especially in small firms, are a key source of firmlevel information (Li, 2001; Norburn, 1989), this survey was

sent to each firm’s most senior executive in charge of research
and development (R&D). The respondents’ titles included chief
scientific officer, vice-president of research, and vice-president
of scientific discovery. In smaller firms with simple structures,
the president and CEO or vice-president of R&D received the
questionnaire.
The average responding firm had 91 employees, was 9 years
old, and had 1.32 projects in clinical trials. Further analysis of the respondents revealed that 36% had publicly issued
stock, 74% were located in U.S. biotechnology clusters, 83%
were founded by academic scientists, and 27% were university
spin-offs. Regarding the respondents’ titles, 12% were listed as
president and CEO; 39% as vice president of R&D; 28% as
chief scientific officer; and 21% as vice-president of scientific
discovery.
Following survey methodology used in prior survey studies, Dillman’s (1978) method of mail survey response and
design was used to improve the response rate. Dillman’s survey
methodology involves sending out reminders in order to maximize survey returns. Three mailings, sent 6 weeks apart, were
administered to collect questionnaire responses. The lag time
between the mailings was necessary to collect responses and
update the database with new firm information. In total, 990 surveys were mailed to eligible respondents. The distribution of
the mailings is as follows: 680 usable surveys sent in the first
mailing, 225 sent in the second mailing, and 85 sent in the final
mailing. We received 204 responses but six were deleted due
to missing data. The survey administration achieved a response
rate of 19.8%.
Given that survey response rates have been decreasing over
the past two decades (Baruch, 1999), many researchers analyze early and late responses to identify whether any significant
differences exist between the respondents. The degree of nonresponse bias depends on two factors: the percentage of the sample that does not respond and the extent to which nonresponders
differ systematically from the study population (Barclay, Todd,

TABLE 1
Survey questions
Age
Ownership
Entrepreneurial Orientation

a

Reverse-coded question.

(1) How old is your firm: ______(in years) and ________months
(1) Is your firm’s stock traded on public exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, etc.)?
(1) Innovation #1: Top executives exhibit a strong emphasis on R&D
(2) Innovation # 2: Top executives promote a diversified product pipeline
(3) Innovation #3: Top executives favor dramatic change to pipeline
(4) Risk Taking #1: Top executives favor high-risk projects
(5) Risk Taking #2: Top executives favor bold acts to achieve firm goals
(6) Risk Taking #3: Top executives adopt a wait-and-see attitudea
(7) Proactiveness #1: Top executives initiate actions and competitors respond
(8) Proactiveness #2: Top executives favor being the first business to introduce
products, administrative techniques, and technologies
(9) Proactiveness #3: Top executives favor a strong tendency to be ahead of others
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Finlay, Grande, & Wyatt, 2002). Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
tests were used to determine whether there was any nonresponse
bias influencing this study. The responding DBFs were divided
into three groups: initial mailing, first reminder, and second
reminder. The results revealed no significant differences among
the three groups on organizational characteristics including age,
size, and R&D spending and study variables such as EO and
the three dimensions. The results of the t tests are consistent
with Linder, Murphy, and Briers’s (2001) response-rate metaanalysis which found that 86 of 114 (75.4%) of the studies
they analyzed exhibited no differences between early and late
respondents and between responders and nonresponders.
Measures
A pretest was conducted with respondents who were
employed in a research-intensive industry to (a) determine scale
validity and reliability, (b) identify areas of potential response
bias, and (c) improve the administration of the survey. An electronic survey was used to administer the pretest to master’s of
business administration (MBA) alumni employed in the pharmaceutical industry. The pretest results and respondent feedback revealed no major issues with the questionnaire or survey
scales. Measures in this study were ranked using a Likert scale
that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Reliability was tested using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α).
Entrepreneurial orientation reflects the extent to which “top
managers are inclined to take business-related risks, to favor
change and innovation in order to obtain a competitive advantage for their firm” (Covin & Slevin, 1989, p. 77). This variable
represents the traditional conceptualization of EO as a gestalt
or pattern of decision making (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller,
1983; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). In this variable, the dimensions are measured separately and the results of the individual
assessments are combined to create a composite EO, which
reflects a pattern of entrepreneurial decision making (Hughes &
Morgan, 2007). EO is a nine-item scale that contains questions
that asked respondents about their firm’s product development,
proclivity to take bold actions by supporting uncertain projects,
and willingness to take aggressive actions to exploit opportunities. Firms with high scores tend to act entrepreneurially by
fully exhibiting innovative, proactive, and risk-taking behaviors,
while conservative firms with lower scores tend to wait to
respond to competitors’ actions, are averse to taking risks, and
do not support creative problem solving. Cronbach’s alpha (α)
for the scale is .832.
Innovativeness (INV) reflects a firm’s tendency to engage
in new idea generation, experimentation, and R&D activities
that result in new products and processes (Hughes & Morgan,
2007; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Wang, 2008). The three-item
scale includes questions that asked respondents to reflect on
their firm’s new-product development and R&D portfolio.
Cronbach’s alpha (α) for the scale is .811.
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Proactiveness (PA) highlights top managers’ forwardlooking perspective, a characteristic of a marketplace leader
who has the foresight to act in anticipation of future demands
and shape the environment (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Walter
et al., 2006). The three-item scale includes questions that asked
respondents to reflect on their firm’s first-mover activities.
Firms with a higher score are likely to be more proactive.
Cronbach’s alpha (α) for the scale is .752.
Risk-taking (RISK) emphasizes the degree to which managers are willing to make large and risky resource commitments
(Hughes & Morgan, 2007). The three-item scale asked respondents to assess their firm’s willingness to take risks. Cronbach’s
alpha (α) for the scale is .772.
Age refers to the number of years that have passed since
the DBF was established (Wiklund, 1999). Age draws attention
to a firm’s ability to acquire resources, develop relationships,
and establish legitimacy, which play a critical role in a collaborative drug-development process (Chesbrough, 2006). The
current study uses 8 years of age because it is consistently
used to assess “newness” in technology-based DBFs. To code
this variable, DBFs were segmented into two groups: new
DBFs aged 8 years or less and existing DBFs older than
8 years.
Cluster refers to the geographical location of the
biotechnology firm (Casper, 2007). DBFs located in clusters or “hot spots” grow more rapidly than other industry
participants do (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) because they have
access to resources that pool around centers of economic
activities (Boshuizen et al., 2009). To determine whether a DBF
was located in a biotechnology cluster, we compared respondents’ ZIP codes to the ZIP codes for the top biotechnology
clusters listed in Ernst & Young’s Annual Biotechnology
Report (Ernst & Young, 2005). Since the 1990s Ernst & Young
has published a comprehensive analysis of the international
biotechnology industry, which contains detailed analysis of
industry revenues, cluster characteristics such as firms, and
competitive analysis. Biotechnology studies (Deeds, DeCarolis,
& Coombs, 2000; Lee, Park, Yoon, & Park, 2010; Powell,
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) have utilized information from
Ernst & Young’s biotechnology report.
The 2005 report identified 12 biotechnology clusters in
the United States—California, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia,
Texas, Washington, Florida, and Connecticut. To determine a
DBF’s location, we acquired the ZIP codes for Ernst & Young’s
clusters from the U.S. Census Bureau Metropolitan Statistical
Analysis for 2005 and compared them to the postmarks on
the returned surveys. If a DBF’s postmark was located in a
biotechnology cluster the variable was coded as “1”; otherwise,
it was coded as “0.” In cluster studies, indicator variables that
have been developed using ZIP codes have been used to characterize whether a firm belongs to a cluster (Bell; 2005; Kukalis,
2010).
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Ownership reflects whether a DBF’s stock is publicly traded
on a stock exchange. Respondents were asked whether their
DBF’s stock was traded on a public stock exchange such as the
NASDAQ, AMEX, or OTB. If a DBF’s stock is publicly traded,
the response was coded as “1”; otherwise, it was coded as “0.”
RESULTS
Table 2 contains a list of the descriptives and frequencies for
the responding firms and the variables used in this study.
Hypotheses Testing
The current study seeks to compare EO scores between
two groups of DBFs in various contexts; independent t tests
were used for hypothesis testing. The independent t test is
used to determine whether two sample means are sufficiently
different so as to be unlikely to have been drawn from the
same population (Shaughnessy & Zechmesiter, 1997, p. 393).
Hashai and Almor (2004) used t tests to compare the degree

of internationalization between subsidiaries of marketing-based
firms and firms engaged in R&D or production. The results from
the independent t tests are summarized in Table 3.
Group 1 hypotheses: age. Hypothesis 1 states that existing
DBFs’ EO scores will be higher than scores of new DBFs. The
data do not support Hypothesis 1. There was no significant difference in the scores for existing and new DBFs, t(198) = .333,
p = n.s. Regarding the EO dimensions, the results were mixed.
Hypothesis 1a indicates that existing DBFs’ innovativeness
scores will be greater than those of new DBFs. Although the
mean innovativeness scores for existing firms are higher than
new firms’ scores, the differences were not significant, and the
data do not support this hypothesis, t(198) = .727, p = n.s. The
findings for the final two hypotheses are favorable. Hypothesis
1b suggests that existing DBFs are more proactive than are
their younger counterparts. The results support this assertion,
t(198) = 1.71, p < .05. Conceivably, existing DBFs have products in the development stage and they use their networks for
commercialization purposes. Finally, Hypothesis 1c indicates

TABLE 2
Descriptives and frequencies

Age
R&D Spending
Size
EO
INV
PA
RISK
Ownership: Public
Cluster

Mean

SD

Range

8.98
3.47
3.33
3.36
3.47
3.39
3.19

5.67
0.84
0.68
0.68
0.84
0.79
0.92

2–27 years
$85,000–$450 million
2–440 employees
1–5
1–5
1–5
1–5

Yes

No

65 (32.8%)
145 (73.2%)

133 (67.3%)
53 (26.8%)

TABLE 3
t-Tests analysis: Composite EO and individual dimensions by age, location, and ownership

Model 1: Existing vs. new firms
Existing Firms (96 months -above)
New Firms (0-95 months)
t-Value
Model 2: Cluster vs. noncluster
firms
Cluster Firms
Non-Cluster Firms
t-Value
Model 3: Public vs. private
Public
Private
t-Value

EO

INV

PA

3.35 (0.65)
3.31 (0.72)
0.333

3.52 (0.80)
3.43 (0.88)
0.727

3.48 (0.73)
3.24 (0.84)
1.71∗∗

3.09 (0.93)
3.28 (0.91)
–1.39∗

3.34 (0.72)
3.31 (0.59)
0.214

3.53 (0.87)
3.31 (0.71)
1.65∗∗

3.31 (0.80)
3.35 (0.79)
−0.256

3.17 (0.97)
3.28 (0.77)
−0.778

3.40 (0.63)
3.30 (0.71)
1.77∗∗

3.48 (0.78)
3.47 (0.87)
0.062

3.44 (0.72)
3.27 (0.82)
1.40∗

3.23 (0.90)
3.16 (0.92)
0.476

Note. Mean/(standard deviation), N = 198; significance: ∗ p < .10; ∗∗ p < .05.
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that new DBFs will have higher risk-taking scores than existing DBFs. We find a significant difference in the scores for
existing and new DBFs, t(198) = –1.39, p < .10. New DBFs
may be willing to take risks because they have a lesser stake in
maintaining the status quo (Schumpeter, 1934).
Group 2 hypotheses: clusters. The second group of
hypotheses addresses differences in EO and the dimensions
between DBFs located in biotechnology clusters and those
DBFs located outside of clusters. Model 2 contains the t-test
findings. There was no significant difference in the EO scores
for cluster and noncluster DBFs, t(198) = .214, p > .10. With
respect to innovativeness (Hypothesis 2a), we find that cluster DBFs will possess higher innovative scores than noncluster
DBFs, t(198) = 1.65, p < .05. This positive difference supports
existing studies that identify clusters as hotbeds of innovative activity (Porter, 1998). Hypothesis 2b proposes that cluster
DBFs are more proactive than are their noncluster peers. The
results do not support this hypothesis, t(198) = –.256, p = n.s.
Similarly, Hypothesis 2c, which suggests that noncluster DBFs
should be willing to take more risks than cluster DBFs do, was
not supported, t(198) = –.778, p = n.s.
Group 3 hypotheses: ownership. The last group of hypotheses claims EO differences exist between public and private
DBFs. Model 3 lists the t-test results. Hypothesis 3 indicates
that public DBFs’ EO scores will be higher than the EO scores
of private DBFs. The data support this hypothesis. The analysis
uncovered a significant difference in the EO scores of public and private DBFs, t(198) = 1.77, p < .05. Hypothesis 3a
indicates that public DBFs possess lower innovativeness scores
than private DBFs do. There was no significant difference in
the innovativeness scores of public and private DBFs, t(198) =

.062, p = n.s. Hypothesis 3b indicates that public DBFs possess
higher proactiveness scores than private DBFs do. There was a
significant difference in the proactiveness scores of public and
private DBFs, t(198) = 1.77, p < .05. Finally, Hypothesis 3c
suggests that private DBFs will be willing to take more risks
than public DBFs do. The results do not support this assertion.
Reflecting on our results, we conducted post hoc analyses on
the age categorization because it was the only context in which
DBFs were classified using subjective measures. Determining
a DBF’s location and ownership structure does not require as
much interpretation as defining new firms. In the current study,
we adopted Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven’s (1990) new firm
classification of 8 years. In management studies, new firms
have also been classified as those firms younger than 3 years
(Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006) and 5 years (Qian & Li, 2003;
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). We also include 10 years as a
classification for new firms because it may take 10–15 years,
given the regulatory regime, for a DBF to realize a return on its
research and development efforts (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999);
until then, the firm may have limited revenues.
The results of these analyses are listed in Table 4 and
depicted in Figure 1. There were two significant observations. First, the findings show that a DBF’s EO is stable
across age groups: new firms less than 36 months (M =
3.33), new firms less than 60 months (M = 3.31), new firms
less than 96 months (M = 3.31), and new firms less than
120 months (M = 3.35). Second, all three categories indicate that existing firms have higher mean innovativeness scores
than do new firms. As previously argued, this is one characteristic that makes the biotechnology industry different from
other industries. Schumpeter (1934) argued that new firms

TABLE 4
t-Tests: Additional analysis by age: New firms younger than 3, 5, 8, and 10 years

Model 1: 3 years and below
Existing DBFs (36 months and above)
New DBFs (0–35 months)
t-Value
Model 2: 5 years and below
Existing DBFs (60 months and above)
New DBFs (0–59 months)
t-Value
Model 3: 8 years and below
Existing DBFs (96 months and above)
New DBFs (0–95 months)
t-Value
Model 4: 10 years and below
Existing DBFs (120 months and above)
New DBFs (0–119 months)
t-Value

EO

INV

PA

RISK

3.43 (0.64)
3.33 (0.67)
0.801

3.51 (0.79)
3.22 (1.02)
1.76∗∗

3.36 (0.75)
3.12 (0.95)
1.35

3.15 (0.89)
3.42 (1.03)
–1.53∗

3.43 (0.62)
3.31 (0.66)
1.14

3.46 (0.80)
3.46 (0.93)
0.020

3.34 (0.76)
3.29 (0.84)
0.378

3.11 (0.92)
3.37 (0.89)
–1.85∗∗

3.35 (0.65)
3.31 (0.72)
0.333

3.52 (0.80)
3.43 (0.88)
0.727

3.48 (0.73)
3.24 (0.84)
1.71∗∗

3.09 (0.93)
3.28 (0.89)
–1.39∗∗

3.34 (0.69)
3.35 (0.63)
−0.077

3.52 (0.81)
3.43 (0.85)
0.687

3.35 (0.76)
3.31 (0.80)
0.322

3.12 (0.88)
3.23 (0.93)
−0.835
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FIG. 1.

EO

Innovation

Proactiveness

Risk

Comparison of EO score: new DBFs under 3, 5, 8, and 10 years.

revolutionize the market with their new ways of doing things.
In the biotechnology industry, new firms enter the market with
new inventions, which are sold to existing firms or leveraged
to secure development capital from existing firms. This innovation aligns more with Schumpeter’s (1950) later work. He
amended his original perspective on entrepreneurship and suggested that existing firms have the capital and resources to invest
and out-innovate new firms when bringing new products to market. If innovation consists of invention plus commercialization,
then existing firms might have the resources to out-innovate
their younger counterparts. The next section elaborates on these
findings and discusses their implications.
DISCUSSION
Results Summary
We contend that biotechnology is a unique context
with its strict regulatory regime, resource- and timeintensive new-product development process, and high
level of interorganizational collaborations among nonprofit,
government, and industry actors. In this context, we explored
under what conditions DBFs exhibit an EO. To answer this
research question, we put forth and assessed nine hypotheses
to determine whether one or both conceptualizations of EO,as
a gestalt or as individual behaviors, would be significant across
internal and external situations such as age, location, and ownership structure. We hypothesized that older, cluster-located,
and publicly traded DBFs would have higher EO scores than
would new, remotely located, and private DBFs (Hypotheses
1–3). The results show that there was a positive and mean
significant difference only in the mean EO scores between
public and private DBFs, with public firms having the higher
score. Public firms have access to capital markets to fund
innovative activities. They might also have more collaboration
opportunities than do their private DBFs because public firms
must adhere to rigorous financial reporting requirements, which
may reduce potential partners’ uncertainty about their R&D
assets and business practices. Interestingly, research has found

that public DBFs are engaging in a higher level of risk taking.
Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) contended that there are more
institutional, private, and cross-border investors in the market.
Thus, publicly traded firms seek to secure investors by adopting
riskier strategies that will produce greater expected profits.
Developing systematic processes that promote entrepreneurial
behaviors might enable public DBFs to adapt to and contend
with regulatory, competitive, and ownership pressures.
Regarding the multidimensional assessments, our findings
show that new firms are more risk taking than were their older
peers. Schumpeter (1934) argued that the rules of the game are
created and promulgated by existing firms to support their ways
of doing things and their ability to generate profits. To play the
game, new DBFs have to take risks to establish their legitimacy and secure the resources they need to operate (Hannan
& Freeman, 1987; Stinchcombe, 1965). Older DBFs search
for opportunities to exploit their existing assets by participating in development opportunities with pharmaceutical firms
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), sponsoring faculty research to
move their projects to the next stage of development (Lee,
2000), or actively seeking to be acquired by pharmaceutical
firms that are seeking to restock their pipelines and because
of the lack of interest in biotechnology initial public offerings
(IPOs) (Behnke & Hultenschmidt, 2007; Frantz, 2006).
When testing the multidimensional location hypotheses, our
findings support the assertion that cluster DBFs are more innovative than remotely located DBFs. Porter (1998) argued that
close geographical location spurs innovation. Our assessment of
the individual dimensions in the ownership structure revealed
that public firms had higher proactive scores than did their
nonassertive peers. By adopting a proactive disposition, public DBFs engage in activities such as scanning to search for
opportunities to support innovation as well as to appease current shareholders. These findings contribute to the literature in
the following ways.

Contributions
First, the study expands EO research, which so far has
been primarily focused on assessing the entrepreneurial process in the manufacturing industry (Covin, Green, & Slevin,
2006), across a broad spectrum of mature industries (Tang
et al., 2010), or within the high-technology sector that includes
computers as well as biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms
(Bierly, Damanpour, & Santoro, 2009). By doing so, we gain an
understanding of the entrepreneurial process but may overlook
contextual variations. For example, the results of Hypothesis
1a revealed (1) no statistical differences in the innovativeness
scores of new and existing DBFs and (2) that existing DBFs’
innovativeness scores were higher than those of new DBFs.
This finding contradicts a basic entrepreneurial premise: that
new firms are more entrepreneurial than existing firms (Glaeser
& Kerr, 2009). However, Tripsas’s (1997) exploration of the
typesetting industry indicated that incumbents that possess

CONTEXT AND EO IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY

complementary capabilities can survive and exploit the creative
destruction process ignited by other firms.
Our focus on the biotechnology industry seeks to expand
our understanding of EO beyond mature industries. For example, Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, and Frese (2009) conducted
a meta-analysis of 51 EO studies in which there were several mixed high-technology studies but none solely focused on
science-based businesses. In the last decade, EO studies have
begun to explore knowledge-based phenomena such as learning (Wang, 2008), innovation sourcing (Pérez-Luño, Wiklund,
& Cabrera, 2010), experimental and acquisitive learning (Zhao,
Li, Lee, & Chen, 2011), and knowledge creation (Li, Huang,
& Tsai, 2009). Since biotechnology is a knowledge-intensive
Lindustry where by firms operate in a technologically complex and dynamic environment (Colwell and DeCarolis, 2010),
our study supports the expanding investigation of the interplay
between EO and knowledge.
Second, the findings presented in this article draw attention to the proactive EO dimension. Our analysis revealed
that the proactive dimension was significant in two out of
the three conditions: age and ownership structure. Given the
resource-intensive nature of developing new drugs, adopting a
proactive disposition can improve managers’ ability to process
information (Tang et al., 2010) when scanning the environment to search for new opportunities (Davis et al., 2011).
Biotechnology scholars have explored new opportunities in
terms of exploration and exploitation alliances (Al-Laham,
Amburgey, & Bates, 2008; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), learning and alliance races (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000;
Silverman & Baum, 2002), and alliance and learning networks
(Gay & Dousset, 2005; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996).
The act of creating new knowledge, although it is important,
is not sufficient to transform an invention into an innovation
that has the power to destroy existing technologies and firms
and create new industries. An invention must be followed by
entrepreneurial action before it has significant economic terms
(Utterback, 1971, p. 77). The entrepreneurial action to which
Utterback (1971) referred is the recognition and exploitation of
opportunities. These findings refocus our attention on the significant role that proactiveness plays in the entrepreneurial process
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).
Third, our findings contribute to the rich literature on
biotechnology agglomerations by confirming the differential between innovation among cluster and noncluster firms.
Innovation is a knowledge-centric, social process, and clusters are wellsprings of human capital in the form of specialized workers and university-trained graduate students (Kukalis,
2010) who support the process. The congregation of specialized
talent fosters an environment where purposeful and accidental encounters provide the medium through which knowledge
is created as it is being converted between tacit and explicit
categories (Nonaka & Toyama, 2005). Research has identified
how information dissemination and different modes of communication contribute to cluster innovation (Moodysson, 2008).
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The human capital, potential for structured and informal interactions, and opportunities for face-to-face knowledge transfer
support cluster innovation. The significant difference between
the innovativeness of cluster and noncluster DBFs makes a case
for gaining further insight about why DBFs would choose to be
remotely located when cluster knowledge externalities support
innovativeness. Our understanding of noncluster DBFs is driven
by their role as the “comparison other” in most cluster studies.
To date, there have been a few empirical attempts (Fontes, 2005)
solely focused on identifying remote characteristics.
In summary, our findings contribute to existing studies by
supporting existing literature on cluster innovation and the
importance of proactiveness to EO as well as highlighting
the conditions within the biotechnology industry where the
entrepreneurial process may differ from existing research. In the
following sections, we discuss the implications of our findings.

Theoretical Implications
In this study, we seek to advance knowledge about the importance of time when studying EO. Wiklund and Shepherd (2003,
2005) have argued that EO is a dynamic capability that may
change over time. In their studies, Wiklund and Shepherd measured EO twice with a lag time of several years between each
measurement to assess how EO changes. Our post hoc analysis found that DBFs’ EOs differ for new firms that are defined
as being less than 3, 5, and 10 years old. Figure 1 depicts
EO changes that occur as older firms are classified as new
firms. Interestingly, the mean EO scores for all three EO firms
are similar. The figure suggests that when firms classified as
new are less than 5 years old, these DBFs have the highest
innovativeness. Firms tend to issue IPOs when they are between
5 and 7 years of age (Loughran & Ritter, 2001). New firms less
than 5 years old may be preparing to issue an IPO or to enhance
their reputation as viable collaboration partners.
When DBFs are classified as new up to 8 years old, the findings show that these firms have low innovativeness. Since it
takes an average of 6 years for a firm to transition through drug
discovery and preclinical trials to begin clinical trials (PhRMA,
2013), DBFs less than 8 years old probably have a project in
clinical trials. Interestingly, DBFs that are classified as new and
are less than 10 years old have the highest proactiveness score.
These firms might have an approved product or a product that is
in the final stages of clinical trials. The commercialization process overlaps with the patent protection window. At the end of
clinical trials, a DBF might have less than 10 years to recoup its
R&D costs and accumulate financial resources to fund another
new-product commercialization. Proactive activities such as
international alliances (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004)
or small firm acquisitions (Higgins & Rodriguez, 2006) will
enable these DBFs to continue to leverage their approved product and acquire new science and capabilities. Our study points
to the possibility that key organizational events could change
managerial attentions and their entrepreneurial disposition.
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Second, when assessing EO in small and medium-sized
firms, it may be difficult to untangle managerial beliefs or
wishes from actual firm-level behaviors. EO emerges from
the strategic choice perspective that explains how managers
make decisions that enable their organizations to adapt to
their environment in order to gain an advantage. Many DBFs
are independently owned (Zahra, 1996) firms that have fewer
than 100 employees (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003).
In small and medium-sized firms, top management teams
play significant roles in determining the firm’s strategies and
operating procedures (Lubatkin et al., 2006), which provides
them with unique insight regarding their firm’s entrepreneurial
processes. When assessing EO, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003)
used only SMEs in their sample because top management is
not separated from the firm’s behaviors. This premise also pertains to entrepreneur-led firms where the behaviors of the firm
and those of the entrepreneur are likely to be the same (Poon,
Ainuddin, & Junit, 2006).
EO scholars have acknowledged the extent to which managers influence a firm’s EO. Covin, Green, and Slevin (2006)
described EO as a strategic construct whose conceptual domain
includes certain firm-level outcomes and managerial-related
preferences, beliefs, and behaviors as expressed among a firm’s
top-level managers (p. 57). Simsek, Heavey, and Veiga (2010)
proposed that EO represents CEOs’ decision-making styles
because these executives have significant influence in determining the firm’s goals and objectives. According to Krauss and
peers (2005), “While not emphasized explicitly, the measure is
in fact a psychological assessment of individual EO” (p. 316).
Similarly, Miller (1983) claimed, “In small centralized firms,
entrepreneurship is predominantly influenced by the leader: his
personality, his power, and his information” (p. 773). In small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) like those in the biotechnology
industry, top executives have the insight to assess a firm’s EO
because of their wide range of responsibilities; however, it may
be prudent to proceed with caution when interpreting EO results
because of the possibility of managerial and executive biases
when reporting about their firm’s EO.
Limitations and Future Direction
We would like to highlight some limitations of our study
that draw attention to areas of future research. First, a firm’s
entrepreneurial orientation emerges over time (Lee et al., 2001).
Wiklund (1999) and Wiklund and Shepherd (2003, 2005) used
a longitudinal approach to assess entrepreneurial orientation.
Thus, measuring EO across years would lead to a more robust
understanding of whether a firm enhances its development of
processes and systems that facilitate EO than measuring it at a
single point in time. In the future, research may seek to assess
DBFs’ EO over time; however, because this assessment may be
compromised by the high rate of failure among biotechnology
firms, a future study might focus on publicly traded firms to
minimize the mortality risk.

Second, data in this study were obtained from single informants. Although entrepreneurial studies often rely on single
respondents (Chandler & Hanks, 1994), this reliance may inflate
assessments. Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess (2000) proposed that
one disadvantage in measuring EO using self-reports is the possibility of managerial bias. It is not controversial to presume
that managers of these firms would believe their firms to have
a strategic posture that is closer to the entrepreneurial end of
the spectrum than to the conservative end. SME studies were
more often likely to use surveys to collect data than general
studies because secondary and archival data are usually not
widely available to small, privately owned firms (Bartholomew
& Smith, 2006). Future studies might use triangulation—
the combination of methodologies when studying the same
phenomenon (Denzin, 1978)—to increase the robustness of the
research by offering new insights and addressing problem areas.
Using surveys and public information on firm-level behaviors
such as patent counts to assess innovativeness (DeCarolis, 2003)
will help researchers identify the extent to which differences
exist in the objective and subjective data.
Third, this study did not assess how a firm’s growth plans
influence EO. Since EO emerges over time, firms that seek
to be acquired may not be concerned with developing EO but
may focus on maintaining a high level of innovativeness to
send a signal of high quality to potential acquisition partners.
Understanding how growth motivations influence this study
would offer insight into firms’ desire to develop and maintain an EO. Future research might seek to assess whether a
founder’s growth or exit plans such as acquisition or IPO influence a firm’s development and utilization of an entrepreneurial
strategic posture.
Practical Implication and Conclusion
A DBF’s managers might need to be cautious when attempting to use strategies, processes, and routines from other industries. It may be helpful for managers to assess their firms’
resources and capabilities and to understand industry dynamics
and scientific and technological complexities before adopting
new approaches or dispositions.
In conclusion, given the nature of drug development, there
may be differences in the range of entrepreneurial dispositions
that are available to a firm that can create a new product and sell
it within several months or years versus those the range available to those firms that must wait nearly a decade to reap the
benefits of their R&D investments.
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